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Inflation	Targeting:	A	Panel	Approach	
The	Federal	Reserve	defines	“monetary	policy”	as	any	strategy	that	influences	money	and	credit,	
which	further	affects	GDP.	These	policies	are	used	to	promote	maximum	employment,	stable	
prices	and	moderate	long-term	interest	rates.	Generally,	these	policies	can	be	differentiated	by	
the	choice	of	 target	variables.	Examples	of	monetary	policy	 includes	exchange	 rate	 targeting,	
monetary	targeting,	among	others.	This	paper	will	look	at	inflation	targeting	and	investigate	its	
effect	on	macroeconomic	variables.	
Introduction	
Policy-makers	 have	 the	 authority	 to	 define	 the	monetary	 framework,	 this	 allows	 them	make	
decisions	that	promote	economic	growth	and	development.	These	frameworks	are	often	defined	
by	the	macroeconomic	variable	which	they	decide	to	target.	Developing	countries	used	to	use	
exchange	rate	targets	in	order	to	be	able	to	promote	competiveness,	macroeconomic	stability	
and	 growth	 (Yagci	 [2001]).	 In	 this	 type	 of	 monetary	 framework,	 the	 central	 bank	 (or	 policy	
makers)	is	willing	to	buy	or	sell	foreign	exchange	in	order	to	keep	the	exchange	rate	at	a	certain	
level	 (pegged	 exchange	 rate)	 or	within	 certain	 bands	 (pegged	within	 bands).	 This	 framework	
requires	a	high	level	international	reserve,	so	the	central	bank	can	sell	foreign	currency	when	the	
exchange	rate	is	depreciating	to	counter	this	downward	move,	or	buy	back	foreign	currency	in	
the	 opposite	 case.	 Yagci	 (2001)	 highlights	 the	main	 benefits	 of	 this	 regime:	 1)	 can	 promote	
stability	and	competiveness,	if	peg	is	credible	and	2)	can	keep	interest	rate	at	a	lower	level.	The	
downside	of	this	monetary	policy	 framework	 is	 that	 it	has	 limited	capacity	to	absorb	external	
shocks,	 because	 if	 the	 country	 runs	 down	 its	 international	 reserve,	 the	 policy	 cannot	 be	
maintained.	
	
Developed	countries	were	 inclined	 to	conduct	a	monetary	policy	based	on	monetary	 targets.	
Mishkin	 (2000)	 states	 that	 this	 monetary	 framework	 was	 characterized	 by:	 1)	 reliance	 on	
information	 conveyed	 by	 a	 monetary	 aggregate	 (such	 as	 M1,	 M2,	 or	 other	 aggregate),	 2)	
announcement	of	 targets	 for	monetary	aggregates	and	3)	 some	accountability	mechanism	 to	
prelude	large	and	systematic	deviations	from	the	monetary	aggregates.	Around	the	decade	of	
1970,	Germany,	Switzerland,	USA	and	UK	adopted	this	framework	due	to	high	inflation	concerns.	
Germany	used	the	sum	of	currency	and	bank	deposits	as	monetary	target,	Switzerland	used	M1,	
the	USA	used	M2,	whereas	UK	used	a	broader	aggregate	(M3).	The	former	two	countries	were	
successful	controlling	inflation	using	monetary	aggregates,	attributed	to	the	partial	reliance	of	
the	monetarist	K-percent	rule	of	Milton	Friedman.	
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 as	Mishkin	 (2000)	 continues	 his	 study,	 the	 US	 was	 not	 able	 to	 manage	
monetary	 aggregates	 to	 achieve	 interest	 rate,	 unemployment	 rate	 and	 inflation	 rate	 targets,	
three	main	goals	of	the	Fed	during	1970	decade.	Over	the	course	of	20	years,	the	Fed	abandoned	
the	aggregate	monetary	framework	when	Greenspan	testified	in	Congress	saying	that	the	Fed	
will	no	longer	use	any	monetary	target	as	a	guide	to	conduct	monetary	policy	(Mishkin	[2000]).	
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After	failure	of	controlling	inflation	rate	using	aggregate	monetary	targets,	developed	countries	
started	using	inflation	targeting.	As	of	2014,	countries	like	Canada,	New	Zealand,	Brazil,	Chile,	the	
USA	and	44	more	countries	have	implemented	the	inflation	target	regime	and	10	more	countries	
are	in	the	process	of	implementing	it.	In	this	monetary	framework	an	inflation	target	is	set	and	
publicly	announced,	then	policy-makers	will	do	whatever	best	in	order	to	achieve	said	goal.	
	
	
Figure	1	Number	of	countries	that	have	adopted	the	Inflation	Targeting	Regimen	by	year.	Author’s	elaboration	
	
Countries	that	have	adopted	this	monetary	framework	have	experienced	lower	and	more	stable	
inflation	rate.	This	two	benefits	help	consumers	and	producers	base	their	economic	decisions	
and	plan	ahead	their	consumption	and	investment	plans,	ultimately	boosting	GDP	and	economic	
growth.	
	
In	this	research	project	we	will	describe	inflation	and	inflation	targeting,	along	with	more	details	
of	 its	 benefits.	 Then	 we	 test	 if	 there	 is	 sufficient	 evidence	 to	 support	 this	 advantages,	 and	
determine	how	is	this	monetary	framework	related	to	economic	development.	
Inflation	
As	mentioned	 before,	 inflation	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 the	 general	 change	 of	 prices	 of	 good	 and	
services	and	 it	measures	the	purchasing	power	of	money:	as	 inflation	 increases,	every	unit	of	
money	can	pay	a	smaller	portion	of	goods	and	services.	Although	consumers	are	able	to	afford	
less	goods	and	services,	a	constant	low	and	stable	increase	in	prices	keep	businesses	profitable.	
When	prices	have	too	much	volatility,	produces	and	consumer	may	have	a	hard	time	making	their	
choices	of	production	and	consumption.	On	this	matter	Okun	(1971)	stated	that	this	environment	
of	high	volatility	in	prices	jeopardize	decision-makers	“by	exposing	individuals	to	large	risks	with	
respect	to	the	value	of	their	wealth	and	their	income”.	
	
After	exposing	such	adverse	qualities	of	inflation,	some	people	may	argue	that	an	economy	is	
better	off	without	inflation.	The	truth	is	that	deflation	(when	prices	in	general	decrease)	is	related	
to	much	greater	dangers:	such	as	falling	profits,	increase	of	unemployment,	and	other	problems	
which	can	potentially	yield	an	economic	recession.	So,	even	though	high	and	volatile	inflation	is	
bad	for	the	economy,	deflation	can	be	worse.	
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In	general,	if	the	general	population	expect	a	price	increase	in	the	future,	they	will	increase	their	
short-term	 consumption,	 whereas	 if	 they	 expect	 a	 price	 fall	 in	 the	 future,	 they’ll	 postpone	
present	consumption	and	wait	for	the	prices	to	fall.	This	latter	situation	can	be	dangerous	to	the	
economy,	because	this	reluctant	consumption	can	decrease	short-term	GDP.	
	
If	prices	have	no	variation	at	all	(inflation	rate	equal	to	zero),	producers	have	less	incentive	to	
continue	 supplying	 goods	 and	 services.	 Inflation	 is	 said	 to	 be	 often	 underestimated,	 hence,	
having	an	 inflation	rate	close	to	zero	 is	close	to	be	 in	the	deflation	zone	and	all	 the	concerns	
related	to	it.	Generally,	policy-makers	try	to	avoid	zero	inflation	rate.	
	
The	question	policy-makers	have	to	answer	 is	“how	much	price	variation	 is	good?”	There	 is	a	
generally	accepted	concept	where	“low	and	steady”	inflation	improves	the	economic	growth	and	
development.	Consumers	 form	their	own	future	 inflation	expectation,	based	on	past	 inflation	
levels	 and	 other	 relevant	 information.	 If	 inflation	 is	 kept	 at	 a	 “steady”	 level,	 their	 inflation	
expectation	will	not	be	far	off	actual	inflation,	which	means	that	they	can	base	their	economic	
decisions	 on	 their	 expected	 inflation.	 In	 this	 situation,	 consumers	 will	 not	 postpone	 their	
consumption,	because	they	know	pieces	will	be	higher	on	the	next	year,	and	this	behavior	boosts	
the	GDP	in	the	short	run.	
	
Skeptics	 of	 this	 claim	 often	 ask	 “how	 low?”	 or	 “what	 is	 steady?”	 The	 answer	 of	 those	 last	
questions	 varies	 and	 depends	 on	 which	 country	 we	 are	 dealing	 with.	 In	 general,	 developed	
countries	 set	 their	 inflation	 target	 between	 1%	 and	 2%,	while	 developing	 countries	 set	 their	
targets	from	2%	up	to	18%.	Generally,	policy-makers	use	1%	range	around	their	targets	so	that	
inflation	can	fluctuate	around	the	target,	but	within	the	boundaries.	
Inflation	Targeting	
There	are	different	monetary	frameworks.	In	this	study	we	will	focus	on	inflation	targeting	(IT)	
regime	 and	 analyze	 the	 its	 effect	 on	 GDP	 and	 inflation	 rate.	 Svensson	 (1999)	 highlights	 the	
characteristics	of	the	inflation	target	regime:	policy-makers	state	a	quantitative	inflation	target	
(usually	2%	for	developed	economies),	an	explicit	tolerance	interval	around	the	inflation	target	
(typically	±1%),	and	a	compromise	of	achieving	this	target	without	having	any	other	intermediate	
targets.	Some	concerns	related	to	these	will	be	later	discussed	in	greater	detail.	
	
This	monetary	framework	has	some	requirements	or	“preconditions”	as	Batini	and	Laxton	(2007)	
describe	 inflation	 targeting.	 After	 studying	 emerging	 economies	 that	 have	 adopted	 IT,	 these	
authors	managed	to	identify	four	conditions:	(i)	institutional	independence	of	the	central	bank,	
(ii)	well-developed	technical	infrastructure	with	which	the	central	bank	is	able	to	make	inflation	
forecasts	and	other	economic	modeling	that	 is	deemed	necessary,	 (iii)	an	economic	structure	
where	 prices	 are	 deregulated	 and	 are	 not	 too	 sensitive	 to	 changes	 in	 commodity	 prices	 or	
exchange	rate	variations	and	(iv)	a	healthy	financial	system.	
	
These	are	conditions	for	the	smooth	change	towards	the	inflation	targeting	framework.	However,	
not	meeting	them	have	not	been	a	hinder	for	implementing	it	on	emerging	economies.	Batini	
and	 Laxton	 (2006)	 concluded	 that,	 even	 though	 these	preconditions	 are	not	met,	 developing	
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countries	 are	 capable	 of	 adopting	 this	 framework	 and	 that,	 after	 the	 implementation,	 the	
“preconditions”	are	met,	meaning	that	there	are	improvements	in	institutional	independence,	
and	techniques	structures.	
	
Monetary	 policies	 are	 often	 divided	 in	 two	 strategies:	 discretionary	 frameworks	 and	 rule	
frameworks.	In	the	former	kind	of	monetary-policy	the	central	bank	is	free	to	act	as	it	considers	
it	is	suitable,	given	the	short-term	conditions.	In	rule	frameworks,	the	central	bank	is	bound	to	
respond	according	to	a	rule	set,	often	counter-cyclical	rules,	like	the	Friedman	k-percent,	which	
stated	 that	 the	 central	 bank	 should	 increase	money	 supply	 on	 a	 fixed	 percentage	 each	 year	
regardless	the	state	of	the	economy,	or	the	Taylor-rule,	which	move	interest	rate	depending	on	
the	behavior	of	GDP	growth	and	the	inflation	rate.	Bernanke	and	Mishkin	(1997)	agree	to	identify	
the	inflation	targeting	regime	as	“constrained	discretion”.	They	argue	that	the	IT	framework	is	
not	 a	 rule	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 changes	 in	 policy	 are	 not	 a	 reaction	 provoked	 by	 certain	
macroeconomic	 conditions,	 but	 it	 relies	 on	 the	discretion	of	 the	 central	 bankers	 to	use	 their	
structural	and	judgmental	models	of	the	economy	to	determine	the	policy	actions	that	will	help	
them	achieve	the	inflation	target.	So	this	monetary	framework	is	ruled	by	the	overriding	goal	of	
inflation,	but	relies	on	the	discretion	of	the	policy-makers	to	achieve	that	goal.	
	
There	are	some	concerns	about	some	definitions	related	to	this	monetary	framework.	What	does	
it	mean	 that	 inflation	 rate	 is	 the	only	priority	of	 the	policy-makers	 relative	 to	other	variables	
(unemployment,	 exchange	 rate…)?	 Which	 inflation	 should	 be	 used?	 Which	 should	 be	 the	
inflation	target?	
	
Even	though	policy-makers	refer	to	 inflation	as	the	“overriding	goal”	of	monetary	policy,	they	
usually	 leave	 an	 “escape	 clause”	 for	 secondary	 objectives.	 Developing	 countries	 that	 have	
adopted	 this	 framework	 often	 have	 exchange	 rate	 secondary	 targets,	 because	 they	 are	 very	
vulnerable	to	international	shocks,	such	as	oil	prices	variations	and	changes	in	monetary	policy	
of	developed	countries	(like	USA	or	the	ECB).	
	
There	is	a	discussion	on	whether	the	inflation	target	should	be	a	point	(a	specific	target	number	
surrounded	with	 an	 upper	 and	 lower	 bound)	 or	 a	 range	 (minimum	 and	maximum	 inflation).	
Hammond	(2012)	states	that	having	a	target	point	give	the	public	a	very	clear	signal	of	what	the	
objective	inflation	is	and	using	the	bands	around	the	target,	the	general	population	can	estimate	
the	mid-term	inflation	level.	Using	a	target	range	it	is	very	easy	to	check	if	the	target	was	hit	or	
missed,	but	they	have	the	disadvantage	that	might	imply	that	“the	central	bank	has	imprecise	
control	over	inflation	objective”,	as	Hammond	(2012)	continues.	
	
There	 are	 multiple	 measures	 of	 inflation	 within	 an	 economy,	 consumer	 inflation,	 producer	
inflation,	core	inflation,	and	such.	Given	this	variety	of	price	variation,	which	one	should	we	use	
for	target?	Bernanke	and	Mishkin	(1997)	answer	this	question	and	respond	stating	that	central	
banks	should	use	the	inflation	measure	that	is	generally	considered	accurate,	timely	and	readily	
understood	by	the	public.	The	selected	inflation	should	also	be	flexible	enough	to	capture	price	
shocks,	which	the	monetary	policy	will	intend	to	smooth	out.	Every	country	that	have	adopted	
the	IT	regime	has	chosen	one	measure	of	inflation	and	has	not	changed	ever	since.	
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The	next	question	that	ought	to	be	answer	is	“what	should	be	the	target	level?”	This	monetary	
policy	 framework	 sets	 its	 target	 to	a	 level	of	 inflation	 that	will	help	 the	economy	grow	 to	 its	
potential	GDP.	This	is	intended	to	produce	different	benefits	to	the	economy,	such	as	reducing	
inflation	and	GDP	volatility.	Countries	that	have	adopted	this	framework	have,	on	average,	lower	
inflation	than	those	countries	that	have	not	adopted	it.	
	
Some	critics	of	the	inflation	targeting	regimen	argue	that	the	inflation	is	very	difficult	to	control	
due	to	the	lags	under	which	the	monetary	policy	operates.	This	problem	is	worse	for	emerging	
market	countries,	as	Mishkin	(2000)	analyzed.	These	countries	often	face	very	high	inflations	that	
are	meant	to	be	brought	down,	but	the	monetary	policy	operates	with	very	long	lags	and	their	
forecast	models	 often	 yield	 large	 errors.	 This	 combination	 of	 issues	 affects	 the	 central	 bank	
credibility	of	its	ability	of	achieving	the	inflation	target.	However,	in	the	sample	used	in	this	study	
there	are	17	countries	with	lower	middle	income	and	low	income1	that	have	successfully	adopted	
this	monetary	framework	and	have	lower	and	steadier	inflation.	
	
	
Figure	2	Average	rate	of	inflation	of	17	low	income	and	lower	middle	income	countries.	Author's	elaboration.	
	
Approximated	ten	years	after	 the	“birth”	of	 inflation	targeting	 framework,	Neumann	and	von	
Hagen	 (2002)	 tested	 the	 benefits	 of	 adopting	 this	monetary	 policy.	 They	 concluded	 that	 the	
countries	with	this	framework	had	lower	inflation	rates	and	less	inflation	volatility,	and	they	said	
that	those	countries	“converged	closely	to	the	stability	performance	of	the	Bundesbank”.	
	
Not	 so	 long	 after	 Neumann	 and	 von	 Hagen	 (2002)	 publication,	 Ball	 and	 Sheridan	 (2003)	
conducted	 a	 similar	 study	 and	 noted	 that	 the	 decrease	 in	 inflation	 that	 inflation-targeting	
countries	experienced	was	also	present	on	non	inflation-targeting	countries.	They	asserted	that	
																																																						
1	 Armenia,	 Bangladesh,	 Georgia,	 Ghana,	 Guatemala,	 Indonesia,	 Kenya,	 Malawi,	 Moldova,	
Mongolia,	Mozambique,	Niger,	Pakistan,	Philippines,	Sri	Lanka,	Uganda,	and	Ukraine.	
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the	decrease	on	inflation	and	its	volatility	was	nothing	but	a	mean	regression	effect,	so	whether	
a	country	adopted	the	inflation	targeting	regime	had	no	effect	whatsoever.	
	
	
Figure	3	Average	inflation	rate	for	countries	with	inflation	targeting	framework	and	countries	without	it.	Author's	elaboration	
Miller	 et	 al	 (2012)	 compiled	 different	 studies	 regarding	 inflation	 targeting	 and	 its	 impact	 on	
economic	 performance.	 After	 comparing	 all	 the	 research,	 he	 concluded	 that	 the	 inflation	
targeting	 regime	 does	 not	 affect	 economic	 performance	 in	 developed	 countries,	 but	 it	 has	
positive	effects	on	developing	countries.	Similarly,	Walsh	(2009)	investigated	the	benefits	of	the	
IT	regime	and	concluded	that	the	decrease	in	inflation	(and	inflation	volatility)	was	more	evident	
in	developing	countries	 rather	 than	developed	countries.	He	argues	 that	developed	countries	
adopted	 this	monetary	 policy	 framework	 in	 periods	where	 their	 inflation	was	 already	 low	or	
stable.	For	this	reason,	there	is	no	clear	evidence,	for	developed	countries,	of	the	benefits	of	the	
IT	scheme.	However,	developing	countries	that	adopted	the	IT	have	lowered	their	inflation	level,	
volatility	as	well	as	reduction	in	GDP	growth	volatility	(Gonçalves	and	Salles	[2006]).	
	
Non-macroeconomics	 benefits	 include	 an	 increase	 in	 transparency.	 Policy-makers	 try	 to	 be	
transparent	and	trustworthy	so	that	the	general	public	may	trust	them	and	start	making	their	
economic	decisions	based	on	the	promised	 inflation	target,	this	 is	called	“anchoring”	 inflation	
expectations.	For	this	reason,	in	this	regimen,	the	expected	inflation	is	a	very	important	variable	
for	the	policy-makers.	Bordo	and	Siklos	(2014)	defined	central	bank	credibility	as	a	“commitment	
to	follow	well-articulated	and	transparent	rules	and	policy	goals”.	They	conclude	that	the	central	
bank	credibility	level	of	inflation	targeting	countries	is	similar	to	credibility	levels	during	the	gold	
standard	period.		
	
Another	 of	 these	 benefits	 is	 the	 increase	 of	 accountability.	 Alongside	 the	 declaration	 of	 the	
inflation	target,	there	are	penalties	for	the	policy-makers	if	they	do	not	meet	their	goals	in	the	
right	time.	Every	time	this	target	is	not	met,	people	in	general	may	start	losing	their	“anchor”	to	
the	 inflation,	 and	 the	 policy-makers	 may	 lose	 their	 credibility.	 In	 order	 to	 boost	 the	
trustworthiness	 and	 transparency,	 those	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 monetary	 policy	 improve	 their	
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communication	towards	the	general	public,	usually	this	is	done	using	monthly	announcements.	
One	 of	 the	most	 important	 benefits	 is	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 policy-makers.	 By	 not	 being	
influenced	by	 the	 government,	monetary	policy	 can	be	performed	 so	 that	 it	 can	 achieve	 the	
inflation	target	and	not	having	any	other	intermediate	goal.	
	
Even	 though	many	 benefits	 have	 been	 attributed	 to	 the	 inflation	 targeting	 regimen,	 Epstein	
(2003)	argued	that	none	are	a	consequence	of	this	regime,	but	to	other	policy	measures	that	are	
used	 in	 this	 monetary	 framework.	 Epstein	 (2003)	 claims	 that	 countries	 with	 IT	 regime	 has	
accomplished	to	lower	inflation	rate	has	done	so	at	the	same	“output-price”	as	countries	without	
IT	regime.	Further	more,	he	says	that	all	the	countries	use	the	same	instrument	to	lower	inflation	
rate:	increase	interest	rate.	
	
This	research	project	will	investigate	the	benefits	of	the	IT	framework	stated	above.	Particularly	
we	will	study	the	effect	of	this	regime	on	GDP	and	 inflation,	using	 information	of	47	 inflation	
targeting	countries	and	82	non-inflation	targeting	countries	from	1990	to	2014.	Table	1	show	the	
distribution	of	the	countries,	by	the	World	Bank	classification,	used	in	the	sample	and	Table	2	
shows	the	detailed	list	of	countries.	The	selection	criterion	was	based	on	information	availability:	
we	choose	those	countries	that	had	at	least	50%	of	the	observation	for	GDP,	Inflation,	Capital	
formation,	Labor,	and	Government	deficit.	For	those	cases	where	the	time	observations	were	not	
consecutive,	a	linear	approximation	was	used	to	fill	in	the	missing	observation.	
	
Table	1:	Country	distribution	
 World	Bank	Classification IT	Countries	 Non-IT	Countries	 Total	
High	Income	
High	income:	OECD	 15	 12	 27	
High	income:	nonOECD	 1	 16	 17	
Upper	middle	income	 16	 17	 33	
Low	Income	
Lower	middle	income	 12	 22	 34	
Low	income	 3	 15	 18	
	 Total	 47	 82	 129	
Table	1:	County	distribution	by	classification.	Source:	World	Bank	database	
	
In	general,	high	income	countries	have	experienced	a	GDP	growth	of	0.76%	from	2000	to	2013.	
For	 most	 of	 this	 period,	 IT	 countries	 had	 higher	 GDP	 than	 non-IT	 countries.	 From	 2009	 the	
average	GDP	for	IT	countries	has	fallen,	and	this	is	partly	explained	by	the	fact	that	since	that	
year,	the	lower	end	of	high	income	countries	has	adopted	this	monetary	framework	which	has	
lowered	 the	 average	GDP	of	 the	 IT	 countries,	while	 the	 upper	 end	 of	 high	 income	 countries	
(mainly	non-OECD	countries)	has	not	implemented	this	regime.	
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Figure	4	Average	GDP	for	high	income	countries.	Author's	elaboration	
	
High	income	countries	that	use	the	inflation	targeting	as	monetary	framework	experienced	lower	
inflation	than	those	countries	that	don’t	use	IT.	Even	though,	the	inflation	targeting	is	related	to	
decrease	inflation	rate	and	reduce	its	volatility,	it	does	not	make	countries	immune	to	external	
shocks.	Prove	to	this	claim	is	the	increase	in	inflation	rate	in	2008	for	all	countries.	During	this	
year	we	experienced	what	many	economists	claim	to	be	the	“worst	financial	crisis	since	the	Great	
Depression”.	During	these	years,	different	banks	declared	bankruptcy	and	had	to	shut	down	their	
operations,	like	Lehman	Brothers	in	the	USA.	After	this	financial	crisis,	IT-countries	managed	to	
keep	a	lower	inflation	rate	than	non	IT-countries.	
	
	
Figure	5	Average	inflation	rate	for	high	income	countries.	Author’s	elaboration.	
	
Figure	6	shows	the	evolution	of	the	average	GDP	for	low	income	countries.	In	this	graph	we	can	
see	that	low	income	countries	that	implemented	inflation	targeting	have	higher	GDP	than	those	
countries	that	have	not	applied	this	monetary	regime.	
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Figure	6	Average	GDP	for	low	income	countries.	Author’s	elaboration.	
	
Figure	7	shows	the	behavior	of	the	inflation	rate	for	this	group	of	countries.	For	both	IT-countries	
and	non	 IT-countries	 inflation	 rate	have	been	 roughly	 the	 same	over	 the	 years,	 however,	 IT-
countries	 experienced	 lower	 inflation	 rate	 during	 the	 2008	 financial	 crisis	 than	 the	 non	 IT-
countries.	
	
	
Figure	7	Average	inflation	rate	for	low	income	countries.	Author's	elaboration	
Methodology	
For	this	investigation	we	will	use	an	unbalanced	panel	data	collected	from	1990	to	2014	for	129	
countries.	When	using	this	type	of	data,	the	estimation	of	the	parameters	is	based	on	fixed	effects	
or	on	random	effect	models.	The	former	is	used	when	it	is	presumed	that	there	is	an	unobserved	
effect	that	is	correlated	with	each	explanatory	variable	in	all	periods.	This	methodology	subtracts	
the	time	average	to	each	 individual,	which	will	eliminate	the	unobserved	effect	 (because	 it	 is	
believed	 its	constant).	The	 latter	methodology	assumes	that	 there	 is	some	sort	of	correlation	
between	 the	 explanatory	 variables	 and	 the	 unobserved	 effect.	 In	 order	 to	 estimate	 the	
parameters,	 the	 random	effect	methodology	 subtracts	a	portion	of	 the	 time	average	 to	each	
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individual	that	depends	on	the	variance	of	the	error	term,	variance	of	the	unobserved	effect	and	
the	number	of	time	periods	and	then	estimates	the	parameters	using	generalized	least	squares.	
	
We	will	 use	 in	 this	 investigation	 the	 fixed	effect	 and	pooled	OLS	estimations	 and	 specify	 the	
following	regressions:	
	 𝑦",$ = 𝛽' + 𝛽)𝑦",$*) + 𝛽+𝐼𝑛𝑓",$*) + 𝛽/𝐼𝑛𝑓",$*)+ + 𝛽0𝑘",$ + 𝛽2𝑙",$ + 𝛽4𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐",$ + 𝛿)𝐼𝑇",$ + 𝜖	𝐼𝑛𝑓",$ = 𝛽' + 𝛽)𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝",$ + 𝛽+𝑖",$ + 𝛽/𝐼𝑛𝑓",$*) + 𝛽0𝐼𝑛𝑓",$*)+ + 𝛿)𝐼𝑇",$ + 𝜐	
	
where	y	represents	the	logarithm	of	the	GDP	in	current	US	dollars;	Inf	is	the	inflation	rate,	k	is	
the	gross	capital	formation	as	a	percentage	of	GDP;	l	is	the	total	labor	force	as	a	percentage	of	
total	 population,	 educ	 correspond	 to	 education,	GovExp	 is	 the	 government	 current	 account	
balance	as	a	percentage	of	the	GDP	and	i	is	the	real	interest	rate.	We	include	the	inflation	term	
squared	 in	 order	 to	 capture	marginal	 effects	 of	 this	 variable.	 Table	 3	 summarizes	 the	 list	 of	
variables	used	in	this	study.	The	variable	of	interest	for	the	investigation	is	the	dummy	variable	
IT.	Results	of	the	fixed	effect	and	pooled	OLS	estimates	are	presented	in	Table	4.	
	
In	general,	lagged	GDP	and	capital	formation	were	statistically	significant	in	the	determination	of	
the	GDP,	determining	between	0.95%	to	0.99%	and	0.20%	to	0.50%,	 respectively.	Total	 labor	
didn’t	have	a	statistically	significant	impact	over	GDP,	according	to	the	pooled	OLS	estimates,	but	
the	opposite	using	the	fixed	effect	estimations.	According	to	the	latter	methodology,	total	labor	
is	related	with	an	increase	of	output	between	0.40%	and	0.50%.	Different	measures	of	education,	
as	an	approximation	of	productivity,	did	not	have	a	significant	impact	on	GDP.	Even	though	both	
methodologies	captured	decreasing	marginal	effects	of	inflation	rate	on	GDP,	this	effect	is	very	
small	(close	to	0)	and	not	statistically	significant.	
	
For	both	methodologies	and	controlling	for	different	measures	of	education,	inflation	had	a	very	
small	effect	(ranging	from	0.20%	to	1.81%)	on	GDP	and	it	is	not	statistically	significant.	Judging	
by	the	R-squared,	the	pooled	OLS	model	explained	99%	of	the	GDP	determination,	whereas	the	
fixed	effect	model	explained	89%.	The	former	methodology	shows	that	this	monetary	framework	
has	a	positive	effect	of	0.80%	after	controlling	for	primary	and	secondary	enrollment,	whereas	
for	these	same	productivity	measures,	the	fixed	effect	model	shows	an	impact	of	1.81%.	
	
Using	a	sample	of	countries	with	high	income	(using	the	World	Bank	classification)	we	estimated	
the	effects	of	adopting	the	inflation	targeting	frame	work	using	fixed	effects	model.	For	these	
countries,	this	adoption	is	not	statistically	significant,	but	its	related	to	positive	effects	that	ranges	
from	1.31%	to	3.15%,	however	controlling	for	tertiary	education,	the	adoption	of	this	framework	
has	a	negative	effect	of	0.20%.	Repeating	the	same	analysis	for	low	income	countries,	we	get	a	
positive	relationship	between	this	monetary	regime	and	GDP,	meaning	that	the	adoption	of	the	
inflation	 targeting	 framework	 increases	 the	 GDP	 between	 1.01%	 and	 1.51%,	 however	 this	
relationship	 is	 not	 statistically	 significant.	 For	 this	 group	 of	 countries,	 after	 controlling	 for	
secondary	education	enrollment	we	get	a	negative	relationship	between	IT	and	GDP,	but	it	is	not	
statistically	significant.	Detailed	results	are	shown	in	Table	5.	
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Different	 methodologies	 and	 different	 samples	 yielded	 mixed	 evidence	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	IT	framework	and	GDP	determination.	In	general,	this	regime	has	a	positive	relationship	
with	GDP	(the	adoption	of	the	IT	framework	increases	GDP),	but	there	is	not	enough	evidence	to	
conclude	that	the	relationship	is	significant.	
	
Analyzing	the	inflation	specification	previously	described	we	found	that	the	government	current	
account	balance	plays	a	significant	role	determining	inflation	rate;	the	pooled	OLS	showed	that	
marginal	increase	of	the	current	account	balance	is	related	with	a	decrease	of	0.057	in	inflation,	
however	the	fixed	effect	model	showed	a	similar	relationship,	but	a	higher	magnitude	(0.079	vs	
0.057).	Both	methodologies	showed	the	expected	relationship	between	inflation	rate	and	real	
interest	rate.	A	marginal	increase	of	real	interest	rate	is	related	with	a	0.18	and	0.25	decrease	in	
inflation,	for	the	pooled	OLS	and	fixed	effect	model,	respectively.	The	pooled	OLS	model	captured	
marginal	effect	of	 lagged	 inflation,	showing	marginal	decreasing	return	on	 inflation,	however,	
this	effect	was	not	captured	by	the	fixed	effect	model.	
	
According	 to	 the	 pooled	 OLS	 results,	 adopting	 inflation	 targeting	 regime	 is	 related	 with	 a	
decrease	in	inflation	rate	of	0.74,	but	this	effect	is	higher	when	used	the	fixed	effect	methodology	
(0.75	vs	0.74).	Although	these	estimates	show	the	right	sign,	only	the	pooled	OLS	estimates	are	
statistically	significant.	Table	6	shows	the	results	in	detail.	
	
In	Table	7	we	show	the	results	for	the	fixed	effect	model	using	high	and	low	income	countries.	
Current	account	balance	has	more	weight	determining	inflation	in	high	income	countries	than	
low	 income	one	 (0.124	vs	0.016).	 For	 low	 income	countries,	 inflation	 rate	 showed	a	 stronger	
inertial	component	than	high	income	countries	(0.134	vs	0.101),	but	for	both	group	of	countries,	
this	variable	was	not	statistically	significant.	For	both	type	of	countries,	the	real	interest	rate	was	
statistically	 significant	 and	 was	 related	 to	 a	 decrease	 of	 inflation	 of	 0.22	 (for	 high	 income	
countries)	and	0.30	(for	low	income	countries).	
	
Using	high	income	countries,	the	fixed	effect	model	showed	that	the	adoption	of	the	inflation	
targeting	framework	was	related	to	a	decrease	in	inflation	of	1.99,	but	for	low	income	countries	
this	monetary	framework	is	associated	with	an	increase	in	inflation	of	0.623.	This	last	result	has	
the	opposite	sign	that	it	was	expected.	We	analyzed	the	inflation	rate	at	the	year	of	adoption	of	
the	low	income	countries	and	noticed	that	for	some	years,	new	countries	adopting	this	monetary	
framework	had	higher	inflation	rate	than	the	low	income	countries	that	already	were	using	this	
regime.		
	
Philippines,	in	2002,	was	the	first	low	(middle)	income	country	that	adopted	IT	regime,	and	it	had	
a	2.72	inflation	rate.	The	following	year,	Bangladesh	adopted	this	regime,	with	an	inflation	rate	
of	5.66%.	 In	2005,	Guatemala	changed	 its	monetary	 framework	 for	 the	 IT	 regime	and	had	an	
inflation	rate	of	9.10%.	This	might	be	a	partial	explanation	of	why	the	fixed	effect	estimator	had	
a	positive	relationship	between	inflation	rate	and	the	adoption	of	IT	regime,	instead	of	a	negative	
one.	
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So	 far	we	have	 studied	 the	effects	 of	 Inflation	 Targeting	on	GDP	and	 inflation	 rate,	 however	
nothing	has	been	said	about	the	inverse	relationship.	A	very	interesting	question	to	answer	would	
be:	 what	 is	 the	 causality	 relationship	 between	 these	 variables?	 Given	 that	 there	 are	 many	
countries	with	different	GDP	levels	and	inflation	rates	that	adopt	this	monetary	regime,	it	is	not	
entirely	clear	which	is	the	causal	relationship.	It	is	hard	to	say	if	countries	adopt	the	IT	regime	
because	the	have	“high”	GDP	and	“low”	inflation	rate,	or	if	they	achieve	“high”	GDP	and	“low”	
inflation	rate	because	the	implemented	this	monetary	framework.	The	decision	to	adopt	IT	is	not	
well	understood	and	could	be	influenced	by	many	other	factors	that	were	not	taken	into	account	
in	this	study.	
Conclusion	
The	Inflation	Targeting	Regime	was	first	adopted	by	New	Zealand	in	1989.	This	monetary	policy	
framework	 requires	 policy-makers	 to	 commit	 to	 a	 target	 inflation	 that	 is	 consistent	with	 the	
potential	GDP	growth,	so	that	the	general	population	would	base	their	economic	decision	upon	
that	 inflation	 target.	 In	 theory,	 the	 IT	 regime	 can	 potentially	 decrease	 inflation,	 reduce	 the	
volatility	of	 inflation	and	GDP	growth,	but	this	positive	effects	are	more	evident	 in	developed	
countries	rather	than	developing	countries.	This	thesis	project	studied	these	benefits	using	data	
of	58	inflation	targeting	countries	and	71	non-inflation	targeting	countries	from	1990	to	2014.	
The	panel	evidence	show	that	there	is	a	small	positive	relationship	between	this	monetary	policy	
framework	and	GDP,	but	it	is	not	statistically	significant.	In	this	study	we	found	that	the	effects	
of	IT	regime	on	GDP	are	greater	in	high	income	countries	than	on	developing	countries,	which	is	
different	to	what	is	commonly	found	in	other	investigations.	
	
The	 adoption	 of	 inflation	 targeting	 is	 linked	 to	 a	 decrease	 of	 inflation	 rate,	 although	 not	
statistically	significant.	We	found	that	in	developing	countries	this	relationship	is	opposite	to	the	
theoretical	 correlation,	 due	 to	 the	 constant	 increase	 of	 inflation	 level	 of	 new	 developing	
countries	that	implement	the	IT	regime.	
	
Even	though	the	results	shown	are	not	statistically	significant,	there	are	non-economic	benefits	
related	to	this	monetary	framework	that	are	not	considered	in	this	study.	The	inflation	target	
framework	helps	the	central	bank	to	have	more	independence	to	conduct	monetary	policy	and	
also	increases	the	accountability,	so	that	this	entity	is	not	left	alone	to	do	what	it	pleases	with	no	
consequences.		
	
Further	research	
This	investigation	could	be	improved	if	more	observations	are	added.	Using	more	observations,	
estimations	 are	more	 precise,	 with	 which	 we	 could	 draw	 better	 conclusions	 on	 what	 is	 the	
relationship	between	inflation	targeting	regime	and	GDP	and	inflation	rate.	More	observations	
can	be	obtained	by	relaxing	the	selection	criteria	that	is	used:	in	this	investigation	we	only	used	
countries	that	had	at	least	50%	of	information	on	GDP,	Inflation,	Capital	formation,	Labor,	and	
Government	deficit.	
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Generally,	the	relationship	between	IT	and	other	macroeconomic	variables	is	studied	using	time	
series	 models.	 However,	 this	 can	 be	 also	 analyzed	 using	 panel	 data	 that	 accounts	 for	 time	
variations.	 In	 order	 to	 improve	 further	 researches,	 we	 recommend	 using	 more	 lags	 of	 time	
variables,	doing	this	will	capture	any	autocorrelation	that	might	be	implied	in	the	model.	Another	
issue	worth	considering	is	endogeneity:	since	it	is	not	very	clear	the	decision	process	of	countries	
to	adopt	the	inflation	targeting	framework,	having	this	framework	as	an	endogenous	variable	is	
a	possibility	that	should	be	taken	into	account	for	additional	research.	
	
Further	investigations	should	be	able	to	test	the	causal	relationship	between	the	adoption	of	the	
Inflation	Targeting	regime	and	GDP	and	inflation	rate.	This	will	shed	more	light	on	the	matters	of	
which	conditions	are	necessary	for	the	implementation	of	this	framework	and	have	a	clear	idea	
of	what	the	benefits	are.	
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Annex	
Table	2:	List	of	countries	used	
Country	 Classification	 Inflation	Targeting	since	
Albania	 Upper	middle	income	 2009	
Algeria	 Upper	middle	income	 	
Angola	 Upper	middle	income	 	
Armenia	 Lower	middle	income	 2006	
Australia	 High	income:	OECD	 1993	
Azerbaijan	 Upper	middle	income	 2014	
Bahamas,	The	 High	income:	nonOECD	 	
Bahrain	 High	income:	nonOECD	 	
Barbados	 High	income:	nonOECD	 	
Belarus	 Upper	middle	income	 2013	
Belgium	 High	income:	OECD	 	
Belize	 Upper	middle	income	 	
Benin	 Low	income	 	
Bhutan	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Bolivia	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Botswana	 Upper	middle	income	 2006	
Brunei	Darussalam	 High	income:	nonOECD	 	
Bulgaria	 Upper	middle	income	 	
Burkina	Faso	 Low	income	 	
Burundi	 Low	income	 	
Cambodia	 Low	income	 	
Cameroon	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Canada	 High	income:	OECD	 1991	
Central	African	Republic	 Low	income	 	
Chad	 Low	income	 	
Colombia	 Upper	middle	income	 1999	
Comoros	 Low	income	 	
Congo,	Dem.	Rep.	 Low	income	 	
Costa	Rica	 Upper	middle	income	 2011	
Croatia	 High	income:	nonOECD	 	
Cyprus	 High	income:	nonOECD	 	
Denmark	 High	income:	OECD	 	
Djibouti	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Dominican	Republic	 Upper	middle	income	 2012	
Ecuador	 Upper	middle	income	 	
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Egypt,	Arab	Rep.	 Lower	middle	income	 	
El	Salvador	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Equatorial	Guinea	 High	income:	nonOECD	 	
Estonia	 High	income:	OECD	 	
Ethiopia	 Low	income	 	
Fiji	 Upper	middle	income	 	
Finland	 High	income:	OECD	 1993	
France	 High	income:	OECD	 	
Greece	 High	income:	OECD	 	
Guinea-Bissau	 Low	income	 	
Guyana	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Honduras	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Hong	Kong	SAR,	China	 High	income:	nonOECD	 	
Hungary	 High	income:	OECD	 2001	
Iceland	 High	income:	OECD	 2001	
Iran,	Islamic	Rep.	 Upper	middle	income	 	
Ireland	 High	income:	OECD	 	
Israel	 High	income:	OECD	 1997	
Italy	 High	income:	OECD	 	
Jamaica	 Upper	middle	income	 	
Japan	 High	income:	OECD	 2013	
Jordan	 Upper	middle	income	 	
Kazakhstan	 Upper	middle	income	 2015	
Korea,	Rep.	 High	income:	OECD	 1998	
Kuwait	 High	income:	nonOECD	 	
Kyrgyz	Republic	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Lao	PDR	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Latvia	 High	income:	nonOECD	 	
Lesotho	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Luxembourg	 High	income:	OECD	 	
Macao	SAR,	China	 High	income:	nonOECD	 	
Macedonia,	FYR	 Upper	middle	income	 	
Madagascar	 Low	income	 	
Malaysia	 Upper	middle	income	 	
Mali	 Low	income	 	
Malta	 High	income:	nonOECD	 	
Mauritania	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Mauritius	 Upper	middle	income	 	
Mexico	 Upper	middle	income	 2000	
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Bangladesh	 Lower	middle	income	 2003	
Morocco	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Nepal	 Low	income	 	
Netherlands	 High	income:	OECD	 	
New	Zealand	 High	income:	OECD	 1989	
Nicaragua	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Norway	 High	income:	OECD	 2001	
Oman	 High	income:	nonOECD	 	
Panama	 Upper	middle	income	 	
Paraguay	 Upper	middle	income	 	
Peru	 Upper	middle	income	 2001	
Poland	 High	income:	OECD	 1998	
Portugal	 High	income:	OECD	 	
Qatar	 High	income:	nonOECD	 	
Romania	 Upper	middle	income	 2005	
Sao	Tome	and	Principe	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Saudi	Arabia	 High	income:	nonOECD	 	
Senegal	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Serbia	 Upper	middle	income	 	
Slovenia	 High	income:	OECD	 	
Solomon	Islands	 Lower	middle	income	 	
South	Africa	 Upper	middle	income	 2000	
Spain	 High	income:	OECD	 1995	
St.	Lucia	 Upper	middle	income	 	
St.	Vincent	and	the	
Grenadines	
Upper	middle	income	 	
Swaziland	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Sweden	 High	income:	OECD	 1995	
Switzerland	 High	income:	OECD	 2000	
Syrian	Arab	Republic	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Tajikistan	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Thailand	 Upper	middle	income	 2000	
Togo	 Low	income	 	
Tonga	 Upper	middle	income	 	
Trinidad	and	Tobago	 High	income:	nonOECD	 	
Turkey	 Upper	middle	income	 2006	
Georgia	 Lower	middle	income	 2009	
United	Kingdom	 High	income:	OECD	 1992	
United	States	 High	income:	OECD	 	
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Uruguay	 High	income:	nonOECD	 2007	
Vanuatu	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Yemen,	Rep.	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Ghana	 Lower	middle	income	 2007	
Guatemala	 Lower	middle	income	 2005	
Indonesia	 Lower	middle	income	 2005	
Kenya	 Lower	middle	income	 2014	
Malawi	 Low	income	 2012	
Moldova	 Lower	middle	income	 2010	
Mongolia	 Upper	middle	income	 2012	
Mozambique	 Low	income	 	
Niger	 Low	income	 	
Pakistan	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Philippines	 Lower	middle	income	 2002	
Sri	Lanka	 Lower	middle	income	 	
Uganda	 Low	income	 2011	
Ukraine	 Lower	middle	income	 2015	
Table	2:	List	of	countries	used	in	this	study.	
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Table	3:	Variable	List	
Variable	 Description	
GDP	 GDP	 at	 purchaser's	 prices	 is	 the	 sum	 of	 gross	 value	 added	 by	 all	
resident	producers	in	the	economy	plus	any	product	taxes	and	minus	
any	 subsidies	 not	 included	 in	 the	 value	 of	 the	 products.	 It	 is	
calculated	without	making	deductions	for	depreciation	of	fabricated	
assets	 or	 for	 depletion	 and	 degradation	 of	 natural	 resources.	 Data	
are	in	current	U.S.	dollars.	Dollar	figures	for	GDP	are	converted	from	
domestic	 currencies	 using	 single	 year	 official	 exchange	 rates.	 For	 a	
few	countries	where	 the	official	 exchange	 rate	does	not	 reflect	 the	
rate	 effectively	 applied	 to	 actual	 foreign	 exchange	 transactions,	 an	
alternative	conversion	factor	is	used.	
Gross	capital	
formation	
Gross	 capital	 formation	 (formerly	 gross	 domestic	 investment)	
consists	 of	 outlays	 on	 additions	 to	 the	 fixed	 assets	 of	 the	 economy	
plus	net	changes	in	the	level	of	inventories.	Fixed	assets	include	land	
improvements	(fences,	ditches,	drains,	and	so	on);	plant,	machinery,	
and	 equipment	 purchases;	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 roads,	 railways,	
and	the	like,	including	schools,	offices,	hospitals,	private	residential	
dwellings,	 and	 commercial	 and	 industrial	 buildings.	 Inventories	 are	
stocks	 of	 goods	 held	 by	 firms	 to	 meet	 temporary	 or	 unexpected	
fluctuations	 in	 production	 or	 sales,	 and	 "work	 in	 progress."	
According	 to	 the	 1993	 SNA,	 net	 acquisitions	 of	 valuables	 are	 also	
considered	capital	formation.	
Inflation	 Inflation	 as	 measured	 by	 the	 consumer	 price	 index	 reflects	 the	
annual	 percentage	 change	 in	 the	 cost	 to	 the	 average	 consumer	 of	
acquiring	 a	 basket	 of	 goods	 and	 services	 that	 may	 be	 fixed	 or	
changed	at	specified	intervals,	such	as	yearly.	The	Laspeyres	formula	
is	generally	used.	
Labor	force	 Total	 labor	 force	comprises	people	ages	15	and	older	who	meet	the	
International	 Labour	 Organization	 definition	 of	 the	 economically	
active	population:	all 	people	who	supply	labor	for	the	production	of	
goods	 and	 services	 during	 a	 specified	 period.	 It	 includes	 both	 the	
employed	and	the	unemployed.	While	national	practices	vary	 in	the	
treatment	of	such	groups	as	the	armed	forces	and	seasonal	or	part-
time	workers,	 in	 general	 the	 labor	 force	 includes	 the	armed	 forces,	
the	 unemployed,	 and	 first-time	 job-seekers,	 but	 excludes	
homemakers	 and	 other	 unpaid	 caregivers	 and	 workers	 in	 the	
informal	sector.	
Real	interest	
rate	
Real	 interest	 rate	 is	 the	 lending	 interest	 rate	 adjusted	 for	 inflation	
as	measured	by	the	GDP	deflator.	
Current	Account	
Balance	
Current	 account	 balance	 is	 the	 sum	 of	 net	 exports	 of	 goods	 and	
services,	net	primary	income,	and	net	secondary	income.	
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Primary	school	
enrollment	
Gross	 enrolment	 ratio.	 Primary.	 Total	 is	 the	 total	 enrollment	 in	
primary	 education,	 regardless	 of	 age,	 expressed	 as	 a	 percentage	of	
the	 population	 of	 official	 primary	 education	 age.	 GER	 can	 exceed	
100%	 due	 to	 the	 inclusion	 of	 over-aged	 and	 under-aged	 students	
because	of	early	or	late	school	entrance	and	grade	repetition.	
Secondary	school	
enrollment	
Gross	enrolment	ratio.	Secondary.	All	programmes.	Total	is	the	total	
enrollment	 in	 secondary	education,	 regardless	of	 age,	 expressed	as	
a	percentage	of	 the	population	of	official	 secondary	education	age.	
GER	 can	exceed	100%	due	 to	 the	 inclusion	of	over-aged	and	under-
aged	 students	 because	 of	 early	 or	 late	 school	 entrance	 and	 grade	
repetition.	
Tertiary	school	
enrollment	
Gross	 enrolment	 ratio.	 Tertiary	 (ISCED	 5	 and	 6).	 Total	 is	 the	 total	
enrollment	 in	 tertiary	education	 (ISCED	5	and	6),	 regardless	of	 age,	
expressed	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	 the	 total	 population	 of	 the	 five-year	
age	group	following	on	from	secondary	school	leaving.	
Source:	World	Bank	database.	
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Table	4:	Results	from	estimations	(dependent	variable:	log(GDP))	
Method	 Pooled	OLS	 Fixed	Effect	
Inflation	
Targeting	
0.004	
(0.008)	
0.008	
(0.008)	
0.008	
(0.008)	
0.005	
(0.008)	
0.010	
(0.011)	
0.018	
(0.012)	
0.016	
(0.013)	
0.002	
(0.013)	
Lagged	
log(GDP)	
0.997***	
(0.001)	
0.996***	
(0.001)	
0.996***	
(0.002)	
0.996***	
(0.002)	
0.980***	
(0.006)	
0.976***	
(0.007)	
0.977***	
(0.008)	
0.949***	
(0.008)	
Lagged	
Inflation	
Rate	
-0.000	
(0.000)	
-0.000	
0.000	
-0.000	
(0.000)	
-0.000	
(0.000)	
-0.000*	
(0.000)	
-0.000.	
(0.000)	
-0.000	
(0.000)	
-0.000	
(0.000)	
Lagged	
Inflation	
Rate	
Squared	
0.000	
(0.000)	
0.000	
0.000	
0.000	
(0.000)	
0.000	
(0.000)	
0.000.	
(0.000)	
0.000	
(0.000)	
0.000	
(0.000)	
0.000	
(0.000)	
Capital	
Formation	
0.002***	
(0.000)	
0.002***	
(0.000)	
0.002***	
(0.000)	
0.003***	
(0.002)	
0.002***	
(0.000)	
0.003***	
(0.000)	
0.003***	
(0.000)	
0.005***	
(0.001)	
Total	Labor	 0.000	
(0.000)	
-0.000	
0.000	
0.000	
(0.000)	
-0.000	
(0.000)	
0.005***	
(0.001)	
0.004**	
(0.002)	
0.004*	
(0.002)	
0.005***	
(0.002)	
Primary	
Education	
	 0.001	
(0.000)	
	 	 	 0.001***	
(0.000)	
	 	
Secondary	
Education	
	 	 0.000	
(0.000)	
	 	 	 0.001	
(0.000)	
	
Tertiary	
Education	
	 	 	 0.000	
(0.000)	
	 	 	 0.002***	
(0.000)	
Intercept	 0.082**	
(0.031)	
0.056.	
(0.033)	
0.112**	
(0.037)	
0.126**	
(0.043)	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
N	 2,750	 2,381	 2,131	 1,955	 2,750	 2,381	 2,131	 1,955	
Total	Sum	
of	Squares	
14,300	 12,571	 10,982	 9,530	 865.66	 646.4	 570.38	 529.56	
R	Squared	
Adjusted	
0.994	 0.993	 0.993	 0.993	 0.902	 0.890	 0.884	 0.884	
F-statistic	
(p-value)	
0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	
Table	 4	Results	 from	pooled	OLS	 and	 fixed	effect	 estimations.	Dependent	 variable:	 log(GDP).	
Standard	Error	in	parenthesis.	***	indicates	significance	at	0%;	**	indicates	significance	at	1%;	*	
indicates	significance	at	5%,	.	indicates	significance	at	10%.	
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Table	5:	Results	from	fixed	effect	estimations	for	low	and	high	income	countries.	
Dependent	variable:	log(GDP)	
Method	 High	Income	 Low	Income	
Inflation	
Targeting	
0.013	
0.013	
0.020	
(0.014)	
0.031*	
(0.015)	
-0.002	
(0.015)	
0.012	
(0.023)	
0.011	
(0.024)	
-0.012	
(0.024)	
0.015	
(0.026)	
Lagged	
log(GDP)	
0.969***	
(0.008)	
0.968***	
(0.009)	
0.966***	
(0.010)	
0.921***	
(0.011)	
0.983***	
(0.011)	
0.975***	
(0.011)	
0.965***	
(0.015)	
0.949***	
(0.015)	
Lagged	
Inflation	
Rate	
-0.000**	
(0.000)	
-0.000**	
(0.000)	
-0.000.	
(0.000)	
-0.000**	
(0.000)	
-0.000**	
(0.000)	
-0.000**	
(0.000)	
-0.000**	
(0.000)	
-0.000	
(0.000)	
Lagged	
Inflation	
Rate	
Squared	
0.000***	
(0.000)	
0.000**	
(0.000)	
0.000*	
(0.000)	
0.000***	
(0.000)	
0.000**	
(0.000)	
0.000*	
(0.000)	
0.000**	
(0.000)	
0.000	
(0.000)	
Capital	
Formation	
0.002***	
(0.000)	
0.003***	
(0.001)	
0.004***	
(0.001)	
0.006***	
(0.001)	
0.003***	
(0.001)	
0.002**	
(0.001)	
0.003***	
(0.001)	
0.003***	
(0.001)	
Total	Labor	 0.006***	
(0.002)	
0.006**	
(0.002)	
0.006**	
(0.002)	
0.008***	
(0.002)	
0.006*	
(0.003)	
0.002	
(0.003)	
-0.001	
(0.003)	
0.004	
(0.003)	
Primary	
Education	
	 0.000	
(0.001)	
	 	 	 0.002***	
(0.000)	
	 	
Secondary	
Education	
	 	 -0.000	
(0.000)	
	 	 	 0.003***	
(0.001)	
	
Tertiary	
Education	
	 	 	 0.002***	
(0.000)	
	 	 	 0.007***	
(0.002)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
N	 1,685	 1,454	 1,392	 1,285	 1,065	 927	 739	 670	
Total	Sum	
of	Squares	
553	 384	 365	 346	 311	 261	 205	 182	
R	Squared	
Adjusted	
0.907	 0.888	 0.887	 0.891	 0.889	 0.887	 0.871	 0.865	
F-statistic	
(p-value)	
0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	
Table	 5	 Results	 from	 fixed	 effect	 estimations	 for	 low	 and	 high	 income	 countries.	 Dependent	
variable:	log(GDP).	Standard	errors	in	parenthesis.	***	indicates	significance	at	0%;	**	indicates	
significance	at	1%;	*	indicates	significance	at	5%,	.	indicates	significance	at	10%.	
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Table	6:	Results	from	pooled	OLS	and	fixed	effect	estimations.	Dependent	variable:	
Inflation.	
Method	 Pooled	OLS	 Fixed	Effects	
Inflation	Targeting	
(dummy)	
-0.741*	
(0.326)	
-0.751	
(0.832)	
Government	Current	
Account	Balance	
-0.057***	
(0.012)	
-0.079***	
(0.024)	
Lagged	Inflation	Rate	 0.739***	
(0.049)	
0.086	
(0.063)	
Lagged	Inflation	Rate	
Squared	
-0.006***	
(0.001)	
0.003*	
(0.001)	
Real	Interest	Rate	 -0.179***	
(0.018)	
-0.248***	
(0.021)	
Intercept	 2.968***	
(0.303)	
	
	 	 	
N	 834	 834	
Total	Sum	of	Squares	 24,218	 12,094	
R	Squared	Adjusted	 0.414	 0.178	
F-statistic	(p-value)	 0.000	 0.000	
Table	 6	 Results	 from	 pooled	OLS	 and	 fixed	 effect	 estimations.	 Dependent	 variable:	 Inflation.	
Standard	error	in	parenthesis.	***	indicates	significance	at	0%;	**	indicates	significance	at	1%;	*	
indicates	significance	at	5%,	.	indicates	significance	at	10%.	
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Table	7:	Results	from	fixed	effect	estimations	for	high	and	low	income	countries.	
Dependent	variable:	Inflation	
Classification	 High	Income	 Low	Income	
Inflation	Targeting	
(dummy)	
-1.999*	
(0.976)	
0.623	
(1.486)	
Government	Current	
Account	Balance	
-0.124***	
(0.027)	
-0.016	
(0.042)	
Lagged	Inflation	Rate	 0.101	
(0.081)	
0.134	
(0.173)	
Lagged	Inflation	Rate	
Squared	
0.003*	
(0.002)	
-0.000	
(0.007)	
Real	Interest	Rate	 -0.223***	
(0.024)	
-0.304***	
(0.041)	
	 	 	
N	 517	 317	
Total	Sum	of	Squares	 6,199	 5,894	
R	Squared	Adjusted	 0.209	 0.166	
F-statistic	(p-value)	 0.000	 0.00	
Table	 7	 Results	 from	 fixed	 effect	 estimations	 for	 high	 and	 low	 income	 countries.	 Dependent	
variable:	Inflation.	Standard	error	in	parenthesis.	***	indicates	significance	at	0%;	**	indicates	
significance	at	1%;	*	indicates	significance	at	5%,	.	indicates	significance	at	10%.	
	
